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ABSTRACT: Extending to infinite state spaces that are compact metric spaces a result 
previously attained by Dov Samet solely in the context of finite state spaces, a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior for several players is given 
in terms of the players’ present beliefs only. A common prior exists iff for each random 
variable it is common knowledge that all its iterated expectations with respect to any 
permutation converge to the same value; this value is its expectation with respect to the 
common prior. It is further shown that the restriction to compact metric spaces is 
‘natural’ when semantic type spaces are derived from syntactic models, and that 
compactness is a necessary condition. Many of the results are based on theorems from the 
general theory of Markov chains. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The common prior assumption, ever since it was introduced into the study of games 
with incomplete information by Harsányi (1967-1968), posits that all women and men are 
‘created equal’ with respect to probability assessments in the absence of information – 
hence the term common prior – and all differences in probabilities should, in principle, be 
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traced to asymmetries in information received over time. The idea has become very 
pervasive, and in most applications of type spaces to economics it is assumed that 
players’ beliefs can indeed be derived from a common prior by Bayesian updating.  
 
A prior can be interpreted as the beliefs of a player in a previous period. In many 
models, however, any previous period is either fictional or irrelevant to the matter being 
studied. It is also clear that there are many plausible models of type spaces in which it is 
impossible for the players to have arrived at their current beliefs via updating from a 
common prior. This leads naturally to the question of whether a criterion can be 
identified by which one can tell, through the current beliefs of the players, that they have 
a common prior.  
 
Aumann (1976), in his celebrated agreeing-to-disagree theorem, presented a 
necessary condition for the existence of a common prior in terms of present beliefs: if 
there is a common prior, then it is impossible to have common knowledge of difference 
in the beliefs of any given event. For many years, sufficiency remained an open question.  
 
In the 1990s, several authors, by extending the notion of disagreement to differences 
in the expectation of a general random variable, were able to show that the impossibility 
of there being common knowledge of disagreement is also a sufficient condition for the 
existence of a common prior. Morris (1995) proved this result, in the context of a finite 
state space, by considering how the absence of common priors can affect the willingness 
to conduct trade in various trading environments. Feinberg (2000), utilising techniques 
closer to pure game theory, showed that both in the context of finite state spaces andof  
infinite but compact state spaces, a lack of common priors implies the existence of at 
least one common bet for which each player will subjectively assess that he or she has 
positive expectation – and showed that compactness is necessary for that result. Samet 
(1998b) proved the same result, with a finite state space, using separating hyperplane 
techniques. Finally, the extension of this result to compact spaces with a separating 
hyperplane argument – and appeal to the Riesz representation theorem – was attained in 
Heifetz (2001). 
 
As Samet (1998a) pointed out, this criterion, based on disagreements, satisfactorily 
solves the question of how one can tell when players have a common prior, but it fails to 
express the common prior in a meaningful way; the fact that a disagreement cannot be 
common knowledge may guarantee the existence of a common prior, but it tells us 
nothing about this common prior. He then proceeded, in that same paper, to present a 
very different necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior that 
not only identifies the common prior when it exists, but also provides an epistemically 
meaningful interpretation to it. 
 
This condition is expressed intuitively in Samet (1998a) in a colourful story. Imagine 
that Adam and Eve – who have both excelled in their studies at the same school of 
economics – are asked what return they expect on IBM stock. Having been exposed to 
different sources of information, we oughtn’t be surprised if the two provide different 
answers. But we can then go on to ask Eve what she thinks Adam’s answer was. Being a 
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good Bayesian, she can compute the expectation of various answers and come up with 
Adam’s expected answer. Likewise, Adam can provide us with what he expects was 
Eve’s answer to that question. This process can continue, moving back and forth between 
Eve and Adam, theoretically forever. There are, in this example, two possible infinite 
sequences of alternating expectations, one that starts with Eve and one that starts with 
Adam. 
 
Samet calls this process ‘obtaining an iterated expectation’, and shows that, when the 
relevant state space is finite, there exists a common prior if and only if both of these 
sequences converge to the same limit.  
 
He achieves this result by representing Adam’s beliefs
1
 by a type matrix 1M  and 
Eve’s beliefs by type matrix 2M . These then form two ‘permutation matrices’, 
121
MMM =σ , which is intended to be used for the process of obtaining iterated 
expectations starting with Adam, and 212 MMM =σ , which does the same for the iterated 
expectations starting with Eve. It then turns out to be the case that both 
1σ
M and 
2σ
M  are 
ergodic Markov matrices, and hence by standard results in Markov chain theory, each of 
them has a unique invariant probability measure, which may be labelled respectively 
1p  
and 2p . It is then shown that if 21 pp ≠ , Adam and Eve cannot share a common prior. On 
the other hand, if 21 pp = , then not only is there a common prior, it has positively been 
identified – it is precisely 21: ppp == . 
 
This is a remarkable result, made all the more remarkable by the fact that it applies 
results developed in Markov theory for the study of stochastic processes to answer a 
question that seems not to be even remotely related. Samet (1998a), however, proves it 
only in the context of finite state spaces. Given the results in Feinberg (2000) and Heifetz 
(2001), which extend the other major criterion for a common prior to compact state 
spaces, it is natural to wonder whether the Samet characterisation can also be shown to 
hold in compact state spaces. 
 
It is the goal of this paper to show that there is an affirmative answer to that question, 
and that, just as in Feinberg (2000), the compactness is necessary. The significance of 
such a result is clear, given that there are many models of interest which involve infinite 
state spaces and cannot be reduced to a finite space – we therefore extend the application 
of the Samet criterion to many models to which it previously could not be applied. The 
compactness limitation will also be shown not to be as constricting as it might appear at 
first glance, by appealing to an idea appearing in Feinberg (2000) in order to show that all 
‘natural’ type-space models, in a sense that is made rigorous in the body of the paper, are 
compact. 
 
                                                 
1
 For the sake of simplicity here, we will make the mild technical assumption that the entire relevant state 
space is the meet of the Adam and Eve type space. 
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It should also be noted that the Samet criterion is significant because it provides, in 
principle, a way of calculating practically a common prior given a type space. In the 
finite state space context, one can form the type matrices and apply numerical solutions 
for calculating invariant probability measures in Markov chains – a subject of active 
research – in order to ascertain whether or not there is a common prior and if one exists, 
to identify it. Similarly, with the extension here of the Samet criterion to the more general 
compact spaces, it now becomes possible, given knowledge of the players’ type spaces, 
in principle to estimate the expected values of random variables by use of numerical 
solutions, such as those appearing in e.g. Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre (2003).  
 
The following rough correspondences exist between results in this paper and those 
that appear in Samet (1998a), save for the fact that the results in that paper are strictly 
limited to finite state spaces, whereas that restriction is lifted here: 
 
Proposition 1 here is (roughly) an infinite state space version of Proposition 4 of 
Samet (1998a); Proposition 2 here corresponds to Proposition 5 of Samet (1998a); and 
similarly Proposition 3 corresponds to Proposition 2’ and Proposition 4 to Theorem 1’. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE PAPER 
 
Definitions relating to type spaces and priors in general appear in section 2.1. Section 
2.2 lists the major definitions and results from Markov chain theory that will be used in 
the sequel. The connection between Markov chain theory and type spaces is made 
explicit in section 3, which also introduces our definition of an ‘admissible’ type space. 
The main results of the paper are in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 relates to the idea of a 
‘natural’ topology induced by syntactically modelling type spaces as opposed to semantic 
modelling, as discussed in Feinberg (2000), and shows that the results of this paper apply 
to all type space models induced from syntactic considerations. Section 7 shows that 
compactness is necessary for our results. 
 
The paper concludes with some pointers to possible future avenues of research related 
to the subject matter covered here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS AND RESULTS 
 
 
2.1  TYPE SPACES 
 
A type space for a set of players is a tuple Iiii tI ∈Ω ),(,,, κF . The set of players is 
denoted by },...,1{ nI = , where 2≥n . Ω  is a measurable space of arbitrary cardinality, 
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whose elements are called states. The knowledge function 
iκ on Ω  is defined so that 
)(ωκ i  denotes player i’s knowledge when the true state of the world is ω . The symbol 
F  represents a σ -field of measurable events (subsets of Ω ), and the beliefs – or 
probability measure – of each player at each state of the world is denoted by )|( ω⋅it . 
 
The knowledge functions iκ  generate partitions iΠ of Ω , by 
 
)}()(|{:)( ωκωκωω iii =′′=Π  
 
The meet of Iii ∈Π )( is the partition Π  of Ω  which is the finest among all partitions 
that are coarser than iΠ  for each i. For each Ω∈ω , )(ωΠ  denotes the element of the 
meet containing ω . A somewhat more constructive way to define the elements of the 
meet utilises the concept of ‘reachability’. A state ω′  is reachable from ω  if there exists 
a sequence ωωωωωω ′== m,...,,, 210 such that for each }1,...,1,0{ −∈ mk , there exists a 
player 
ki such that )()( 1+Π=Π kiki kk ωω . It is well-known that )(ωω Π∈′  iff ω′  is 
reachable from ω , so that the relation of reachability can be used to define the partition 
Π . 
 
Denote by iK  the σ -field generated by iΠ . This σ -field will be required to satisfy 
the property that for all players  
 
F⊆iK  
 
so that the atoms of the knowledge partitions of each agent are F -measurable. 
 
The probability distributions )|( ω⋅it  are required to satisfy three important 
properties: 
 
i. )|( ω⋅it  is F -measurable, for each player and each state 
ii. 1)|)(( =Π ωωiit , for each player and each state 
iii. For every event F∈A  the function )|( ⋅Ati  is iK -measurable for each 
player 
 
Property ii) can be described in words as saying that each player ascribes probability 
one to what he or she knows. Property iii) has the further important implication that each 
agent knows his or her own distribution, i.e. if the player has two different distributions in 
two states then he or she can distinguish between these states, so that for each 
)(ωω iΠ∈′ , )|()|( ωω AtAt ii =′ .  
 
A random variable is a real-valued function on Ω . For a probability measure υ and a 
random variable f on Ω , the expectation of f with respect to υ  is ∫Ω= )()(: ωυωυ dff . 
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For each player i and random variable f, i’s expectation of f, denoted fEi is the random 
variable  
 
∫Ω= )|()(:))(( ωϖϖω ii dtffE  
 
Given a type space, one can ask whether the space might have come to exist, in its 
current state, from a space with no information at all, by the players acquiring new 
information over time and updating their beliefs in a Bayesian manner. Each player’s 
possible initial belief on the no-information primeval space is called a prior. In general, 
given player i’s current type, there will not be a single prior from which the player could 
have arrived at the current state from the (hypothetical) primeval past – there will be a set 
of possible priors. A main question is then whether or not the agents have a common 
prior, meaning a possible initial identical belief that implies the differences in probability 
assessments currently seen amongst the players can be attributed solely to asymmetric 
information received over time.  
 
More formally, anF -measurable probability distribution µ  over Ω  is a prior for 
player i if for every measurable event F∈A  
 
∫Ω= )()|()( ωµωµ dAtA i  
 
In words, µ  is a prior for player i if i’s types )(ωit  are the posteriors of µ  conditional on 
i’s information function it . A probability measure )(Ω∆⊆P  is a common prior if it is a 
prior for each of the players Ii∈ . 
 
As usual, Aχ  is the indicator function of an event F∈A  taking the value 1 in A and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
2.2 MARKOV CHAINS 
 
A stochastic kernel or transition probability function on ),( FΩ  is a function P such 
that  
 
i. )|( ω⋅P  is a probability measure for each fixed Ω∈ω  
ii. )|( ⋅EP  is an F -measurable function on Ω  for each fixed event F∈E   
 
Given a transition probability function P, a Markov chain over ),( FΩ  is a discrete-
time homogenous dynamical system that evolves in time in accordance with the n-step 
probability function )|( ωEPn  defined recursively by  
 
)|()|()|()|()|( 11 ωϖϖωϖϖω −
ΩΩ
− ∫∫ == nnn dPEPdPEPEP  
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for all F∈E  and Ω∈ω . 
 
Fix for the rest of this section a Markov chain M over ),( FΩ  with transition 
probability function P. 
 
Let )(Ω∆  denote the space of probability measures on Ω , with this space naturally 
outfitted with the induced weak* topology. It is possible to regard P as a function from 
)(Ω∆  to )(Ω∆ , as follows. For each )(Ω∆∈υ , let 
 
)()|(:))(( ωυωυ dEPEP ∫Ω=  
 
Then P acts on )(Ω∆  by way of Pυυ a . We will interchangeably write Mυ  to 
stand for the same thing as Pυ , accepting the mild notational abuse of identifying M with 
its transition probability function. Using this notation, a probability measure υ  is 
invariant with respect to the Markov chain M if Mυυ = . If such a measure exists, M is 
said to admit an invariant probability measure. 
 
The transition probability function P can also be considered as operating on bounded 
functions in the following way. For each bounded integrable function f from Ω  to R, let 
 
∫Ω= )|()(:))(( ωϖϖω dPfPf  
 
Then Pf is a well-defined bounded function. Again, we will permit ourselves to write 
Mf to mean Pf .  
 
If υ  is an invariant probability measure with respect to the Markov chain M, then P 
can also be considered to be a linear operator on ),(:)( 11 υυ F,Ω= LL into itself. We can 
then define, for any k and )(1 υLf ∈  
 
∫Ω= )()|(:)( ϖωϖω fdPfP
kk  
 
We have in addition the concept of the Cesàro mean, defined as 
 
∑
−
=
=
1
0
)( )(
1
:)(
n
k
kn fP
n
fP ωω  
 
If Ω  has a topology τ , denote the class of bounded continuous functions with respect 
to τ from Ω  to R by )(ΩC . Then the chain M satisfies the weak Feller property if P 
maps )(ΩC  to )(ΩC .  
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Let ϕ  be a non-trivial σ -finite measure for the space Ω . A Markov chain M is ϕ -
irreducible if  
 
0)|(
1
>∑
∞
=n
n EP ω  
 
for all Ω∈ω  whenever 0)( >Eϕ  for F∈E .  
 
We will make use of the following important theorems from the theory of Markov 
chains. These three theorems appear, in Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre (2003), 
respectively as Theorem 7.2.3, Proposition 4.2.2, and an amalgam of Theorem 2.3.4, 
Proposition 2.4.2 and Proposition 2.4.3: 
 
THEOREM (Existence of invariant probability measure). Let Ω  be a compact metric 
space, and let M be a Markov chain on Ω . Then M admits an invariant probability 
measure. 
 
THEOREM (Uniqueness of invariant probability measure). Let M be a ϕ -irreducible 
Markov chain and suppose that P admits an invariant probability measure υ . Then υ  is 
the unique invariant probability measure for P.  
 
THEOREM (Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem for Markov chains). Let M be a Markov chain 
and suppose that P admits an invariant probability measure υ . For every )(1 υLf ∈  there 
is a function )(1
* υLf ∈  such that  
 
*)( ffP n →  υ -almost everywhere 
 
and 
 
∫ ∫= υυ dfdf   *  
 
In addition, if υ  is the unique invariant probability measure of M, then *f is constant 
υ -almost everywhere, and ∫= υdff  * , υ -almost everywhere, so that 
 
the time-average   lim )( =∞→ fP
n
n the space-average  ∫ υdf  , υ -a.e. 
 
 
3. TYPE SPACES WITHIN THE MARKOV FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 RELATING TYPE SPACES TO MARKOV CHAINS 
 
In this section, we relate the concepts of type spaces and Markov chains. 
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First, note that by definition, the probability measure )|( ⋅⋅it  of each player i satisfies 
the conditions for being a transition probability function, hence we can associate with 
each player a Markov chain based that probability measure, and label it iM .  
 
In general, given any two probability measures 1P  and 2P , one can further define a 
new probability measure )|(12 ωEPP  by 
 
∫Ω= )|()|()|( 1212 ωϖϖω dPEPEPP  
 
This obviously can be iterated any number of times. In particular, given a measure 
P , we recapitulate the definition of the infinite sequence of measures 1)}|({ ≥⋅ n
n
P ω . 
 
In our specific context, given any two players i and j and a measurable event E, the 
probability distribution )|( ωEtt ji  based on it and jt  is similarly defined by 
 
∫Ω= )|()|()|( ωϖϖω jiji dtEtEtt  
 
In particular, given an element σ  in Sym(I), the set of all permutations of the 
elements of I, define 
 
)()1(: nttt σσσ L=  
 
iteratively, by using the above to define )()1( nn tt σσ − , then )( )()1()2( nnn ttt σσσ −− , and so forth. 
The Markov chain based on σt will be labelled σM . 
 
We can now re-interpret various notions relating to a type space within the Markov 
framework.  
 
First, note that for any function f on the state space, fM i is precisely the expectation 
of f in player i’s estimation. This is ‘the primal case’ (cf. Samet (1998a)), in the sense that 
the expectation is what is usually considered of economic significance and importance, as 
players choose their actions by comparing the relative expectations of functions.  
 
Second, dual to this is, an invariant probability measure υ  with respect to the Markov 
chain iM  is precisely a prior of player i. A common prior is a probability measure that is 
simultaneously invariant with respect to all { }
Iii
M ∈ .  
 
A sequence ,...),( 21 iis =  of elements of I is called an I-sequence if for each player i, 
kii =  for infinitely many ks. The iterated expectation of a random variable f with respect 
to the I-sequence s is the sequence of random variables ∞=1}...{ 1 kii fMM k . 
 10 
 
Given the identification of fEi with fM i , we can write, given a permutation σ  of I,   
 
)()1()()1()()1(::: nnn ttMMEEtEM σσσσσσσσσ LLL =====  
 
The iterated expectation of f with respect to σ  is defined by the sequence ∞=1}{ k
k fEσ . 
The iterated expectation of f with respect to σ  is, of course, the iterated expectation of f 
with respect to the I-sequence  
 
),...(),...,1(),(),...,1( nn σσσσ  
 
as defined above. 
  
 
3.2 ADMISSIBLE TYPE SPACES 
 
A type space Iiii tI ∈Ω ),(,,, κF  with a topology τ  over Ω  will be termed admissible 
if it satisfies the conditions:   
 
i. Each state Ω∈ω  is contained in an event )(ωA  such that 0)|)(( >ωωAti  
for all i. 
ii. The correspondence )|( ωω ⋅ita  is continuous with respect to the 
topology τ  and the weak* topology of )(Ω∆  
 
These may seem to be artificial requirements, but they are ‘natural’ in a sense that 
will be explained in the section on syntactic models of type spaces.  
 
Note that from previous definitions, it immediately follows that an admissible type 
space satisfies the properties that 0)|( >ωAti  for every event A of non-zero measure and 
non-zero intersection with )(ωiΠ , and that  
 
∫Ω )|()( ωϖϖ idtf  
 
is continuous in ω  for every )(Ω∈Cf . 
 
If in addition to the above conditions ),( τΩ  is compact metric space, the type space 
τκ ,),(,,, Iiii tI ∈Ω F  will be called a compact admissible space in short. Nearly all the 
results in this paper will henceforth assume a compact admissible type space. For 
notational ease, τκ ,),(,,, Iiii tI ∈Ω F  will frequently be written simply as ),( τΩ . 
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4. COMMON PRIORS AND COMPACT ADMISSIBLE TYPE SPACES 
 
Given any Π∈Q , the restriction of iM  to Q , for any player i, will be written as 
Q
iM . Given a permutation σ  in Sym(I), the restriction of σM  to Q is similarly denoted 
by QMσ .  
 
LEMMA 1. Given a type space Ω  satisfying property (i) of admissible type spaces, for 
any permutation σ  of I and player i, for any arbitrary pair of states ω , )()( ωϖ σ iΠ∈ , 
0)|)(( >ωϖσ At . 
 
PROOF. Let ω , )()( ωϖ σ iΠ∈ . By property (i) of admissible type spaces, there exist 
events )(ωA  and )(ϖA  such that, for nji ≤< , 0)|)(()( >ωωσ At j ; for ik <≤1 , 
0)|)(()( >ϖϖσ At k ; and because 0)|)(()( >ϖϖσ At i  and )|)(()|)(( )()( ϖϖωϖ σσ AtAt ii =  
(as ω , )()( ωϖ σ iΠ∈ ), it follows that 0)|)(()( >ωϖσ At i . Unravelling the recursive 
definition of 
)()1( ntt σσ L , these facts taken together imply that 0)|)(( >ωϖσ At . 
 
 
PROPOSITION 1. For any permutation σ  of I, and for any element Q of the meet of a 
compact admissible type space ),( τΩ , QMσ  has a unique invariant probability measure 
Q
σπ . 
 
PROOF. By the assumed properties of an admissible type space, the Markov matrix 
Q
iM )(σ , for any i, satisfies the weak Feller property. The weak Feller property of the 
permutation matrix QMσ , follows readily by its concatenation formation via 
Q
n
Q MM )()1( σσ L . The compactness of the metric topology τ  then guarantees the existence 
of at least one invariant probability measure for QMσ , 
Q
σπ , by application of a theorem 
quoted above. 
 
Next, select an arbitrary event QE ⊆ such that 0)( >EQσπ . By definition of a prior, 
we can readily select a state E∈′ω  such that 0))(|( )1()1( >′Π ωσσ Et  (otherwise there 
would be a contradiction to the assumption that 0)( >EQσπ ). 
 
Let Q∈ω  be selected arbitrarily. Due to the fact that ω  and ω′  share the same 
element of the meet, ω′  is reachable from ω . This means that there exists a sequence 
},...,,,{ 210 ωωωωωω ′== m  such that for each }1,...,1,0{ −∈ mk , there exists a player 
ki such that )()( 1+Π=Π kiki kk ωω .  
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We can now define the following iterative process: by definition, there is a player 
0i  
such that )()( 10 00 ωω ii Π=Π . At step 0 of the iterative process, we conclude from the 
lemma that 0)|)(( 01 >ωωσ At . At step 1, there is a player 1i  such that )()( 21 11 ωω ii Π=Π , 
hence (again by applying the lemma) from 0)|)(( 12 >ωωσ At  and step 0, we arrive (from 
the definition of 2σt ) at 0)|)(( 02
2 >ωωσ At . 
 
At step j, there is a player ji  such that )()( 1+Π=Π jiji jj ωω , hence from 
0)|)(( 1 >+ jjAt ωωσ  and step 1−j , we arrive (from the definition of 
jtσ ) at 
0)|)(( 01
1 >+
+ ωωσ j
j At . 
 
At the end of the process, the conclusion is 0)|)(( 0 >ωωσ m
m At . Finally, by a slight 
tweaking of the proof of lemma 1, from the fact that 0)|()1( >=′ mEt ωωσ  and that for 
Ik∈ , 0)|)(()( >mmk At ωωσ , we can show that 0)|( >′ωσ Et , so that 0)|( 0
1 >+ ωσ Et
m . We 
thus conclude that QMσ  is 
Q
σπ -irreducible, hence from the uniqueness of invariant 
probability measure theorem, Qσπ  is unique.  
 
PROPOSITION 2. For a compact admissible type space Ω , the following conditions are 
equivalent. 
 
i. π  is a common prior on Ω  
ii. π  is an invariant probability measure of the Markov chain iM for each 
Ii∈  
iii. π  is an invariant probability measure of the Markov chain σM  for each 
permutation σ  
 
PROOF. This is the compact-space equivalent to Proposition 5 of Samet (1998a), and 
the proof is nearly identical.  
 
Almost immediately from the definitions, i) and ii) are equivalent. That ii) implies iii) 
is quite easy – if ππ =it  for each player, then one can successively calculate 
ππππ σσσσσ ==== )()()2()()1( ...)()( nnn ttttt LL  for any permutation σ . 
 
It remains to show that iii) implies ii). Suppose iii) and let π  be the invariant 
probability measure. Thus 
 
ππ =)( 21 nttt L  
 
Multiplying from the right by 1t gives 
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1121 )( ttttt n ππ =L  
 
So 
1tπ is an invariant probability measure of 12 ttt nL . But by iii), π  is an invariant 
probability measure of the Markov chain 12 MMM nL , and by the previous proposition 
12 MMM nL  has a unique invariant probability measure. Thus, ππ =1M  and similarly 
ππ =iM  for all i.   
 
COROLLARY. For each Π∈Q  there exists at most one common prior on Q.  
 
 
5.  PERMUTATIONS, ITERATED EXPECTATIONS AND COMMON PRIORS 
 
PROPOSITION 3. Given a compact admissible type space Ω , for each random variable 
f on Ω  and permutation σ , fE nn
)(
lim σ∞→ exists, and on each element Q in Π  is 
constant and is equal to fQσπ , 
Q
σπ -almost everywhere,. 
 
PROOF. This follows from the previous propositions and Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem, 
quoted above.  
 
 
PROPOSITION 4. Given a compact admissible type space Ω , with }{Ω=Π , a common 
prior exists iff for each random variable f, the elements of )}(|{lim
)(
ISymfE
n
n ∈∞→ σσ  
converge σπ -almost everywhere to the same limit. Moreover, if π  is the common prior, 
then this limit is fπ , π -almost everywhere. 
 
PROOF. As above, fE
n
n
)(
lim σ∞→ is constantly fσπ , σπ -almost everywhere, where 
σπ is the unique invariant probability measure of σM  on Ω . Thus, for each f, the limits 
for all σ  are respectively σπ -a.e. equal to each other iff for each f, fσπ are σπ -a.e. 
constantly equal to one and the same value for all σ .  
 
Clearly, if there is a probability measure π  such that ππσ =  for all σ , then fσπ are 
all equal to each other. In the other direction, if in particular for each F∈A , Aχπσ  are all 
equal then there is a probability measure π  such that ππσ =  for all σ .  This amounts, 
given previous claims, to saying that π  is a common prior.  
 
 
We can summarise these results as follows: 
 
THEOREM. Given a compact admissible type space Ω  such that }{Ω=Π , for each 
random variable f and permutation σ  of the players, the iterated expectation of f with 
respect to σ  converges and the value of its limit is common knowledge. Moreover, there 
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exists a common prior if and only if for each random variable it is common knowledge 
that all its iterated expectations with respect to all permutations converge to the same 
value.  
 
 
6. THE SYNTACTIC MODEL AND THE NATURAL TOPOLOGY 
 
 
6.1  THE SYNTACTIC FOUNDATION OF TYPE SPACES 
 
The syntactic construction of type spaces is developed and explored fully in Aumann 
(1999) and Feinberg (2000). Only a brief survey, sufficient for the needs of this paper, is 
presented here. 
 
The syntactic construction begins with a list of letters in an alphabet. Each letter can 
be regarded as representing a natural occurrence, e.g. the letter x might represent the 
occurrence of ‘the pound will rise against the dollar next month’ or y might stand for ‘the 
share price will fall at least by 3 and 1/4 next week’. The syntax is then generated by the 
letters and the players’ beliefs and knowledge. It contains all possible formulae that 
correspond to statements about the occurrences, the knowledge of the players, their 
knowledge about the beliefs of others, and so forth.  
 
More formally, a non-empty finite set of letters α constitutes an alphabet. A formula 
is a finite string of symbols obtained by applying the following four rules finitely often: 
 
i. Every letter is a formula 
ii. If f and g are formulae then so is gf ∨  
iii. If f is a formula then so are )( f¬ and )( fki  for all Ii∈  
iv. If f is a formula then so are )( fpi
λ  for all Ii∈  and every rational number 
10 ≤≤ λ  
 
The intended semantic interpretation of these symbols is that gf ∨  stands for ‘f or 
g’, )( f¬  stands for ‘not f’, )( fki  means ‘player i knows f’, and )( fpi
λ  is ‘agent i 
believes f with probability at least λ ’. 
 
A closed list L of formulae is a set of formulae which satisfy  
 
)()( LgfLf ∈⇒∧∈   implies  Lg∈   
 
A list L is epistemically closed if it satisfies  
 
)( Lf ∈  implies Lfki ∈  for all players i 
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A strongly closed list is a list which is both closed and epistemically closed. Every 
formula that is in the strong closure of the list of formulae state in the appendix to this 
paper is a tautology.  
 
A state of the world ω  is a closed list that contains all tautologies and such that for 
every formula f it satisfies ω∉¬f  iff ω∈f . A state of the world is thus a full 
description of formulae that hold and are coherent in the sense of containing no 
contradictions.  
 
A pairing of alphabet α  and list of players I is called a context, and the set of all 
formulae generated by a context is called its syntax. The set of all states of the world 
defined in a syntax is denoted by Ω , and is called a universal space. 
 
6.2 THE SEMANTICS OF SYNTAX 
 
Given a context and syntax, the set of states of the world can be assigned a natural 
semantic structure, so that we recapitulate the semantics of a type space. In order to do 
this, we need to define the full tuple Iiii tI ∈Ω ),(,,,, κµ F , to go along with the set of 
players I and the universal space  with which we are given. 
 
The knowledge functions iκ  assign to each state of the world ω  the set of all 
formulae in ω  that begin with the symbol ik  i.e. 
} formula somefor  |{)( ggkff ii =∈= ωωκ . This is sufficient to generate the partitions 
by way of  
 
I )()( ωκω i if fki E∈=Π  
 
For each formula f, fE denotes the event that f obtains, meaning  
 
}|{ ωω ∈Ω∈= fE f  
 
The σ -field generated by all the events fE  then forms F . The probability measures 
))(|( ωiit Π⋅  are set by 
 
},,10|sup{))(|( ωλλλω λ ∈∈≤≤=Π fpEt iifi Q  
 
and defining ))(|( ωiit Π⋅  in general as the extension of this to all of F . 
 
6.3 THE NATURAL TOPOLOGY 
 
Given a universal space Ω  generated by a syntactic context, the sub-basis for the 
natural topology on Ω  is the set of all events fE where  f  is a formula.  
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With this basic definition to hand, we can prove a series of claims showing that a 
semantic type space generated by a syntactic context, with the natural topology, fulfils 
the assumptions needed for the main propositions proved in this paper. We hope thus to 
justify the supposition of those assumptions, in the sense that we can expect that ‘most’ 
of the type spaces of interest in applications will be generated from syntactic contexts. 
 
CLAIM 1. Each state Ω∈ω  is contained in an event )(ωA  such that 0)|)(( >ωωAti  
for all i. 
 
PROOF. First, we show that for each player i there is a formula ig  and an event igE  
such that 
ig
E∈ω and 0)|( >ω
igi
Et . To show this, assume that it is not true. Then, listing 
the denumerable formulae contained in ω  as ,...},{ 21 ff , 0)|( =ωjfi Et  for each j, so that 
ω∈ji fp
0  and ωλ ∈¬ ji fp  for all Q∈λ . But the tautologies (see the appendix) imply that 
jiiji fpkfp
00 ⇒  and )( 010 jiijii fppfpk ⇒ , which means that ω∈)(
01
jii fpp , and we have 
reached a contradiction. Hence there is a formula ig such that 0)|( >ωigi Et  and igE∈ω . 
 
Next, now that we have to hand the formulae },...,,{ 21 nggg , because 0)|( >ωigi Et  
we have a corresponding list },...,,{ 21 nλλλ  such that 0>iλ  for all i, and ω
λ ∈ii gp
i . 
Starting from player 1 in the list, from the tautologies 
211 ggg ∨⇒ , so )( 2111 gggk ∨⇒ , 
and hence )( 211
1
1 gggp ∨⇒ , thus )( 21111 11 ggpgp ∨⇒
λλ . This means that 
ωλ ∈∨ )( 211 1 ggp , hence 0)|( 211 >∨ ωggEt  . Similar reasoning leads to 0)|( 212 >∨ ωggEt . 
Continuing this line of reasoning in an iterative manner, we can eventually set 
ngggh ∨∨∨= ...21 , and conclude ω
λ ∈)(hp ii , hence 0)|( >ωhi Et  simultaneously for 
all i. Writing hEA =:)(ω , the proof is concluded.  
 
 
CLAIM 2. The correspondence )|( ωω ⋅ita  is continuous with respect to the topology 
τ  and the weak* topology of )(Ω∆ . 
 
PROOF. This is proved in the proof of Theorem 6 of Feinberg (2000).  
 
 
CLAIM 3. Ω  is compact in the natural topology. 
 
PROOF. This is proved in Lemma 1 of Feinberg (2000).  
 
 
CLAIM 4. The natural topology is Hausdorff. 
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PROOF. The sub-basis for the natural topology on Ω  is the set of all events fE where  
f  is a formula. Hence each event fE  is an open set. Since for every two states there is a 
formula that holds in one state while its negation holds in the other state, the Hausdorff 
property follows immediately.  
 
 
CLAIM 5. The natural topology is regular. 
 
PROOF. By standard results, a compact Hausdorff space is normal, which is a stronger 
property than regularity.  
 
 
CLAIM 6. The natural topology is second countable. 
 
PROOF. This follows immediately from the fact that the sub-basis of the natural 
topology is countable, given the countable number of formulae.  
 
 
PROPOSITION 5. Every universal space Ω  generated by a syntactic context, with the 
natural topology, is a compact admissible type space.  
 
PROOF. Claims 1 and 2 establish that Ω  satisfies the conditions of admissibility. 
Claim 3 shows the natural topology to be compact. Claims 4 through 6 together are the 
conditions for Urysohn’s Metrization Theorem (see Munkres (1975)), so that we can 
conclude that Ω  with the natural topology is a compact metric space.  
 
 
7. THE NECESSITY OF COMPACTNESS 
 
In this section we demonstrate that the above results do not hold when the assumption 
of compactness is relaxed. This is accomplished by presenting a simple semantic model, 
with two players, in which consideration of a permutation does not lead to the existence 
of an invariant probability.  
 
Consider two individuals, Anna and Ben, and a denumerable state space 
,...}3,2,1{=Ω . Anna’s partitions is },...}5,4{},3,2{},1{{  and Ben’s partition is 
{{1,2},{3,4},{5,6},…}. The meet in this case is all of Ω .  
 
Ben’s beliefs are always equal probabilities to the two states in each of his partition 
members. Anna’s beliefs are also equal probabilities to the two states in her partition 
members, save for the probability 1 which is necessary for the one state partition 
member.  
 
We can depict the beliefs of each of the two players in the form of infinite matrices: 
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Form the permutation matrix AnnaBen: ×=σM  
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

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


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

=× AnnaBen  
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and note that it forms the following pattern: letting O stand for the set of positive odd 
integers, and regarding σM  as a mapping on the domain NN× , we start with 
2/1)1,1( =σM ,  2/1)1,2( =σM , and for each Oj∈ , =+= )1,(4/1 jjMσ  
=++ )1,1( jjMσ =++ )1,2( jjMσ =++ )1,3( jjMσ =+ )2,( jjMσ =++ )2,1( jjMσ
=++ )2,2( jjMσ )2,3( ++ jjMσ . For all other values of k and l, 0),( =lkMσ . 
 
Suppose now that there is an invariant probability distribution π  with respect to σM . 
Let απ =)1( . Then by the definition of invariant probability, it must also be the case that 
απ =)2( , because ))2()1((5.0)1( πππ += . Similar reasoning leads to the conclusion that 
απ =)3( , απ =)4( , … , απ =)(k , …  
 
Now, ]1,0[∈α , so that either ∑∞= =1 0)(k kπ  or ∑
∞
=
∞=
1
)(
k
kπ . In either case, π  
cannot be a normalised probability. 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
As stated in the introduction, in this paper we have extended most of the results of 
Samet (1998a) to compact metric spaces, shown that compactness is necessary for the 
results, and exhibited that never the less the results apply quite broadly to ‘nearly all’ 
models of interest by showing that every universal space generated by a syntactic context, 
with the natural topology, is a compact admissible type space. 
 
It should be noted here that the results here do not extend all the results of Samet 
(1998a) to compact metric spaces. To be precise, the theorems of that paper, in the finite 
type space context, show that the existence of a common prior implies that for each 
random variable f it is common knowledge in each state that all the iterated expectations 
of f, with respect to all I-sequences s, converge to the same limit. The theorems of this 
paper show that, in the context of a compact admissible type space, the existence of a 
common prior implies that for each random variable f it is common knowledge in each 
state that the iterated expectations of f with respect to each permutation converge to the 
same limit. Whether our results on compact admissible type spaces apply to all iterated 
expectations with respect to all I-sequences remains an open question. 
 
Finally, we note that Aviad Heifetz has expressed the following conjecture: first 
define an improper prior ip  for player i to be a σ -finite F -measurable measure over a 
type space Ω  which satisfies the main condition of a prior, i.e. for every measurable 
event F∈A  
 
∫Ω= )()|()( ωω iii dpAtAp  
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Thus, an improper prior does not allow us to talk about the ‘probabilities’ that player i 
assigns to events at the ex-ante stage, but it still allows us to discuss the relative 
likelihood that he or she ascribes to pairs of events. 
 
Then Heifetz has conjectured that a (not necessarily compact) type space admits a 
(possibly improper) common prior if and only if the Morris-Feinberg criterion holds. In 
analogy, one might similarly conjecture that a (not necessarily compact) type space 
admits a (possibly improper) common prior if and only if the Samet criterion holds. 
Whether or not either of these conjectures is true remains a subject for future research.   
 
 
 
 
 
9. APPENDIX 
 
LOGICAL TAUTOLOGIES 
 
fff ⇒∨ )(  
)( gff ∨⇒  
)()( fggf ∨⇒∨  
))()(()( ghfhgf ∨⇒∨⇒⇒  
 
 
KNOWLEDGE TAUTOLOGIES 
 
ffki ⇒  
))()(())(( gkfkgfk iii ⇒⇒⇒  
)()( fkkfk iii ⇒  
)()( fkkfk iii ¬⇒¬  
 
 
PROBABILITY TAUTOLOGIES 
 
fpi
0  
)()(
1
fpfk ii ⇒  
)()( fpkfp iii
λλ ⇒  
)()( fpfp ii
δλ ⇒  δλ >  
fpgfpgfp iii
δλδλ +⇒¬∧∧∧ )()(    1≤+δλ  
fpgfpgfp iii
δλδλ +⇒¬∧∧∧¬ )()(      1≤+δλ  
fpfp ii ¬¬⇒
δλ  1>+δλ  
)()(1 gpfpgfp iii
λλ ⇒⇒⇒  
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